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INTRODUCTION

In his fascinating and important book The System of the
Constitution,' Adrian Vermeule proposes nothing less than to create a
new research program in constitutional theory, one in which we
analyze constitutional systems as complex systems.2 The key idea is

© 2014 Garrick B. Pursley.
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1. ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011).

2. See id. at 8 ("[S]ystems theory ... is a natural and fitting tool for legal theory in
general and constitutional theory in particular. Because legal systems are aggregates of
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that systems often possess properties that are not properties of any
individual system component.'
Consider some non-legal examples: Philosophers have long
grappled with the mind/body problem-a set of questions revolving
around the properties of a non-physical "mental" substance (such as
consciousness and mental states) that seems capable of causing
physical phenomena (such as speech, movement, and emotional
reactions like crying) but does not conform to physical laws.4 John
Searle's solution is to dissolve the problem by arguing that
consciousness (mind) is not fundamentally different from the
physical; it is an emergent property of the brain's physical system of
neurons.' Neurons fire and interact in complex ways that we do not
fully understand and consciousness is one particular effect of those
interactions. On this account, therefore, consciousness is a property of
functioning brains even though no single part of the system is
conscious.
For any "system, S, made up of elements a, b, c ... there will be

features of S that are not, or not necessarily, features of a, b, c."6 If S
is ten pounds of water and a, b, and c are HO molecules, the weight
of the water is a "system feature" because none of the individual
molecules weighs ten pounds.' The water's volume and density are
also system properties. Weight, volume, and density can be calculated
from observing the properties of the molecules. "[O]ther system
features cannot be figured out just from the composition of the
elements and environmental relations; they have to be explained in

aggregates ... systems theory asks questions from which legal and constitutional theory
can profit.").
3. See infra Part I.B.2.
4. See generally RENE DESCARTES, PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY (1644), reprintedin
1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 177, 215-17 (John Cottingham et al.

trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984) (proposing the existence of a separate mental
substance as a solution to the mind/body problem, an influential position later labeled
"substance dualism"). For a small sampling of recent treatments, see DAVID J.
CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY (1996)

(discussing how physical processes in the brain give rise to mental substances); GILBERT
RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949) (arguing against dualism and claiming that the
mind is merely an illusion); Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, 83 PHIL. REV. 435
(1974) (discussing generally the role of consciousness in the mind/body problem).
5. John Searle, Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness, in
EMERGENCE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 69 (Mark

Bedau & Paul Humphreys eds., 2008).
6. Id.
7. Searle draws a similar analogy in which the system is a stone with molecular
components. See id.
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terms of the causal interactions among the elements."' The water's
liquidity is this kind of emergent property-it cannot be explained by
simply aggregating the properties of the molecules; it is a product of
the molecules' interactions at certain temperatures. The brain's
network of neurons gives rise to consciousness as the water's system
of molecules gives rise to liquidity. We can observe these properties
only if we look at the system as a whole and recognize that it can be
more than the sum of its components' properties.
Constitutional systems, too, are composed of individuals whose
beliefs and decisions are aggregated in groups and institutionsjuries, interest groups, multi-member courts, legislatures, agencies,
and so forth. Our constitutional order may be characterized as a
"system of systems" in that it consists of two levels of aggregationthe aggregation of groups and institutions which themselves aggregate
the actions of individual citizens, judges, legislators, administrators,
and other agents.' The complex interactions of these components
produce surprising effects that are unexplored in constitutional
theory."o Vermeule proposes a new analytic framework centered on
these system dynamics." Theoretical payoffs include unraveling
persistent mysteries of constitutionalism. How can we have a
democratic system when weak campaign finance regulations allow
wealthy interests to disproportionately influence elected officials?
How can we have democracy when unaccountable agencies and
courts do most of the governing? How can we have durable
federalism when the national government has de facto plenary power
under the Commerce and Spending Clauses? Vermeule does not
tackle all of these problems, but he lays important groundwork for a
8. Id.
9. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 3.

10. The effects of a systems-based analysis have been well documented elsewhere. See
Gregory Todd Jones, Sustainability, Complexity, and the Negotiation of Constraint, 44
TULSA L. REV. 29, 30 (2008) (discussing how ecologists have recognized the consequences
of complex systems on their field); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive
Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424, 428-29 (2010) (demonstrating an
understanding of the effects of a complex system by employing adaptive management to
natural resource policy). Likewise, these system effects are more familiar in economics,
political science, and other disciplines. See Jenna Bednar, ConstitutionalSystems Theory:
A Research Agenda Motivated by Vermeule, The System of the Constitution and Epstein,
Design for Liberty, 48 TULSA L. REV. 325, 328-31 (2012) (book review); see also, e.g.,
Adam Martin, Emergent Politics and the Power of Ideas, 3 STUD. EMERGENT ORD. 212
(2010) (discussing generally the emergence of polities and contrasting it with markets);
Nona P. Martin & Virgil Henry Storr, On PerverseEmergent Orders, 1 STUD. EMERGENT
ORD. 73 (2008) (analyzing how spontaneous orders may have negative systems effects on
society).
11. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 6-7.
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new approach to these questions and others. It turns out that much
can be built up from the central idea that complex constitutional
systems may have certain properties-like democracy or a federalist
equilibrium-even if no individual or institutional component of the
system displays those properties.
System effects arise in complex systems-those in which the
agents are heterogeneous and act with both autonomy and
interdependence.12 Theorists characterize ecosystems; economies;
political and social aggregates; systems of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles; and a variety of other aggregates as complex
systems." Processes like climate change, pandemics, and
technological innovation involve complex dynamics that defy
standard linear analysis.14 And recently, commentators have begun
applying systems theory to some legal phenomena."
One hallmark of complex systems is that their behavior is
difficult to predict with reductive analysis of the properties or
behaviors of individual system components. Reductionist views are
based on the belief that some things can be exhaustively described as
"nothing but certain other sorts of things."16 A key insight of systems
theory-and one that pervades Vermeule's work-is that complex
systems cannot be fully described in terms of their components'

12. See Jones, supra note 10, at 33-34. Professor Ruhl notes that "[tihere is no
universally applied definition for complex adaptive systems." J.B. Ruhl, Law's
Complexity: A Primer,24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 887 n.7 (2008).
13. See, e.g., MARK BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS AND

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INTHE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002) (analyzing economies and
political systems); STUART A. KAUFFMAN, REINVENTING THE SACRED: A NEW VISION
OF SCIENCE, REASON, AND RELIGION (2008) (addressing biological and social systems);
RUSS MARION, THE EDGE OF ORGANIZATION: CHAOS AND COMPLEXITY THEORIES OF

FORMAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1999) (discussing social organization); ILYA PRIGOGINE, THE
END OF CERTAINTY: TIME, CHAOS, AND THE NEW LAWS OF NATURE (1997) (examining
physical systems).
14. See Andreas Duit & Victor Galaz, Governance and Complexity-Emerging Issues
for Governance Theory, 21 GOVERNANCE: INT'L J. POL'Y ADMIN. & INST. 311, 311
(2008).
15. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 12 (discussing generally the complexity of the legal
system). For examples of different legal systems being analyzed in this manner, see Jenna
Bednar, The Political Science of Federalism, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 269 (2011)
(federalism); Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of
Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004) (environmental regulation); Daniel A.
Farber, ProbabilitiesBehaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003) (environmental regulation).
16. Searle, supra note 5, at 70 (emphasis added). An example in law is the textualists'
description of congressional action as nothing but the sum of the motivations of individual
members. See infra notes 44-46, 115-19 and accompanying text.
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properties." The extent to which a constitutional order is generally
democratic, for example, may be a system effect. Vermeule argues
that a constitutional system may promote democratic values even if
some or all of its institutional components are not straightforwardly
democratic (like our own federal judiciary)." Accordingly, a central
project in the field is to identify methods of describing and, perhaps,
predicting the behavior of complex systems where reductive analysis
fails.19 Vermeule's is the first sustained exploration of the implications
of complex systems theory for the conventional methodologies of
constitutional theory in the American legal academy.20 His core
theses are (1) we may fairly view constitutional orders, including ours,
as complex "system[s] of systems;" 21 and (2) we should analyze
constitutional orders this way to correct a number of mistakes that
have persistently plagued constitutional theory.22 I argue that both of
these theses are well taken.
By focusing on a few system dynamics and their constitutional
manifestations, Vermeule avoids stretching to import the whole of
complexity theory (with all its baggage).' He sketches what a positive
account of a system of systems would look like and demonstrates that
account's capacity to explain phenomena that conventional
constitutional theory has puzzled over for decades,24 critiques the
descriptive assumptions of conventional normative constitutional
theory, 25 and previews what normative claims might be generated by a
systems account.2 6
Vermeule's first chapter is an overview of complex system
properties and their interconnections; chapters two, three, and four
examine aggregation effects, invisible hand arguments, and selection
and feedback effects, respectively. The final chapter advances a
17. See generally VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 9, 15-17, 21-22, 50-63 (discussing
fallacies of division and composition, which occur when theorists ignore this insight).
18. Id. at 50-51 (discussing "emergent democracy").
19. See PRIGOGINE, supra note 13, at 61-70; Kenneth J. Arrow, Methodological
Individualism and Social Knowledge, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1994); J.B. Ruhl,
Complexity Theory as a Paradigmfor the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up
Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 85253 (1996).
20. See Bednar, supranote 10, at 325-27.
21. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 3.
22. See id. at 5.
23. See id. at 8 (noting that systems theory "is a sprawling, poorly integrated body of
work" and that "some of its applications reek of pseudoscience" characterized by
"mysterious utterances about 'complexity' and 'chaos' ").
24. See id. at chs. 2-4; infra, Part L.A-B.
25. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at chs. 2-4; infra Part II.A.
26. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at ch. 5.

552

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

normative claim. Vermeule maintains that the judiciary, as a complex
aggregate institution, cannot realistically be thought capable of
unified adoption of any single interpretive theory; and that the
inevitability of continuing interpretive disagreement among judges
complicates interpretive theorists' claims about the benefits of their
favored methods.2 7
In this Article, I focus on two senses in which Vermeule's work
advances constitutional theory. In Part I, I canvas system dynamics
to demonstrate how Vermeule's approach provides an analytic bridge
connecting modern scholarship on the behavior of individualjudges,
members of Congress, and other legal officials, with the analysis of
institutional behavior that is familiar (and pervasive) in normative
constitutional theory.29 This institution-level approach is not
obviously mistaken, nor are the theorists using it unaware of the
individual-level analyses available in other literatures; that kind of
grainy analysis does not readily mesh with the claims they want to
make about institutional behavior and imperatives. But melding these
approaches is crucial to the formation of a robust system-level theory,
and Vermeule's work provides needed tools. Put simply, as with
Searle's argument about minds and brains, our descriptions of
constitutional systems needs to include an account of the complex,
non-linear causal relationships between actions at the individual level
and system-level phenomena. The first step toward that account is
recognizing that individual- and system-level perspectives are not
mutually exclusive; Vermeule provides a laundry list of ways in which
they are related. The next important step-which Vermeule leaves
for the future-is to understand these causal connections in principle
and verify their nature and force empirically.
In Part II, I explain how Vermeule's account undermines
descriptive assumptions of much normative constitutional theory and
then work through some implications of this effect. This challenge to
27. Id. at 153.
28. Several political scientists have reviewed Vermeule's The System of the
Constitution. See Bednar, supra note 10; Jeremy Horpedahl, Book Review, 153 PUB.
CHOICE 507, 507-09 (2012); Thomas E. Webb, Book Review, 75 MOD. L. REv. 1182
(2012).
29. Think, for example, of Dworkin and Sager treating "the courts" as a unitary entity
modeling moral progress for the system. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 238-50 (1986) (famously deploying "Hercules," a fictional judge with infinite
resources and cognitive capacities, to describe what courts ideally should do in deciding
cases on his "law as integrity" theory); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN
PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 7 (2004)
(describing several tasks "the Court" should undertake based on his "justice-seeking
account of constitutional[ism]").
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normative constitutional theory constitutes a second advance-it
suggests, against the long ascendency of the normative, that we must
move descriptive constitutional theory back to the center of the
discipline. It turns out that there is a great deal of descriptive and
empirical work yet to do to understand system effects; only from a
foundation improved in this way may normative claims proceed
without the kinds of fundamental errors Vermeule highlights.
To illustrate the value of this descriptive turn, I conclude Part II
by briefly considering how we might re-examine basic questions
about the nature of law from a systems-theory perspective. One
recurring debate in general jurisprudence concerns theoretical
disagreements-for example, disagreements among Supreme Court
Justices over methods of constitutional interpretation. Some theorists
contend that these are disagreements about our system's basic criteria
of legal validityso-what H.L.A. Hart famously called the rule of
recognition."' Such disagreements may appear to undercut Hart's
contention-central to his general account of law-that the rule of
recognition is a social rule established by consensus among legal
officials.3 2 The existence of theoretical disagreement does not show
that official consensus is conceptually impossible; but one might
nevertheless conclude that Hart's account is incomplete insofar as
observed instances of theoretical disagreement show that either (1)
our system generally lacks official consensus on criteria of legal
validity;33 or (2) our officials have failed to reach consensus as to some
validity criteria, especially for contested constitutional issues. Systems
theory offers new leverage on these problems.3 4 Systems theory
suggests adding to Hart's account of the formation of social rules of
recognition one or both of the following propositions: (1) Legal
30. See DWORKIN, supra note 29, at 15-23 (discussing judicial disagreement about the
"grounds of law" in Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889), and TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978)); Scott J. Shapiro, The "Hart-Dworkin"Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in
RONALD DWORKIN 22, 49-50 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007) (arguing that Dworkin's
position has some force against Hart's view).
31. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-10 (3d ed. 2012).
32. See id. at 55-57, 94-110 (discussing social rules and rules of recognition). For a
more in-depth analysis, see infra Part II.B.
33. The obvious extension of this, which I discuss below, is that if Hart's account of
legal systems cannot capture the American system, it must be generally flawed or
incomplete.
34. For existing refutations of the critique in broadly conceptual terms, see Brian
Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1215, 1224-25 (2009)
(proposing an "error theory" account and a "disingenuity" account which state that where
theoretical disagreement occurs, judges either mistakenly believe that there is law on the
relevant issue or feign disagreement for some, perhaps strategic, reason).
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norms may be validated by a rule of recognition at least some parts of
which legal officials need not expressly or consciously accept, but
instead may tacitly accept by repeatedly acting in accordance with the
rule; or (2) a rule of recognition may incorporate criteria that validate
as legal norms certain durable patterns of convergent practice even
absent a conscious moment of public enactment.3 5 On either of these
views, theoretical disagreement would be largely irrelevant to the
existence and functioning of the rule of recognition in our system.
I. THE APTNESS OF THE SYSTEMS ACCOUNT

The obvious first question is whether complex systems theory is
aptly applied to constitutional systems-that is, whether it explains
things that are inexplicable or otherwise fits the phenomena better
than conventional accounts. In this Part, I first situate systems theory
in the constitutional theory literature by juxtaposing it with a
competing analytical framework-the standard reductive linear
framework applied, for example, in the growing literature on the
"real" reasons for judicial decision-making and the methodologically
related literature on congressional functioning. The common tack in
these areas is to attempt to explain the actions of a multi-member
institution exclusively by reference to the characteristics of its
component members and rules. Then, I work through Vermeule's
presentation of system dynamics, focusing on aggregation effects,
interdependence, feedback, non-linear causation, and system effects,
along with corollaries like invisible hand arguments and the general
theory of the second-best. The goal throughout is to highlight these
ideas' relevance to constitutional theory and explain how they
constitute an analytic approach that differs dramatically from the
linear, reductive approach. Finally, I weave these strands together
briefly by considering the classic debate between purposivist and
35. This second solution is less daring than the first, since it merely suggests that we
might have a validation mechanism for constitutional norms similar to the solution that
Hart recognizes for common law norms. See HART, supra note 31, at 95-97, 264-65
(discussing "rule[s] of recognition" and the common law); John Gardner, Some Types of
Law, in COMMON LAW THEORY 51, 60-63 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007) (demonstrating
that Hart's view is compatible with conventional common-law accretion); cf Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975) (arguing that Supreme Court interpretations have the
illusion of carrying the same weight of authority as constitutional text, but are actually
"constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by
Congress"). It is also roughly harmonious with Sunstein's view that binding judicial rulings
can be predicated on incompletely theorized agreements, such as agreement about the
result despite disagreement about which norms compel the result. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36 (1995).
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textualist theories of statutory interpretation. Linear analysis supports
textualists' claim that congressional purpose does not exist, but
systems analysis suggests that the purposivists might be right, albeit
for different reasons than are classically offered in defense of
purposivism. This example exemplifies the new leverage that
Vermeule's approach gives us over a great number of subjects of
constitutional theory, some of which I address in more detail in Part
II.
A.

Analytic Frameworks

A methodological problem arises when constitutional theorists
leverage insights from economics and political science to characterize
legal actors as self-interested rational maximizers, captives of special
interest groups, and idiosyncratic or sporadically strategic actors. 6
Models based on these and other assumed motivations may
successfully predict individual officials' behavior in many instances.
The familiar attitudinal model, for example, predicts fairly well the
votes of judges based on rough proxies for their political
preferences.3 7 But such models do not purport to exhaust or decisively
explain the causes of official decision-making, the better view of
which allows for complex combinations of motivations.3 8 The problem
is that sophisticated accounts of individual officials' motivations are
inconsistent with conventional normative theoretical treatment of
Congress or the judiciary as unitary actors.
A common response is to take sides-embrace positive theory
and draw whatever conclusions are available from individual officials'
motivations; or set those issues aside and focus instead on institution36. For examples of seminal works in the study of economics and political science, see
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES
(1982).
37. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (suggesting that a model based on personal values
and politics, the attitudinal model, is a better model to explain votes of Supreme Court
Justices); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 557, 559-60 (1989) (testing the claim
that Supreme Court Justices' votes are dependent on their political preferences by

creating an "independent measure of the attitudes or values of justices"). Some recent
empirical work takes institutional and other factors into account along with judges'
preferences. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE
(1998).
38. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in
the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) (arguing that existing
positive models do not accurately capture the complex amalgam of causes of judicial
decisions).
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level arguments backed by intuition or anecdote." Indeed, some treat
evidence that individual agents have complex motivations as a basis
for critiquing claims predicated on institution-level analyses: The
American Legal Realists, for example, famously held that legal
reasons are rarely the primary causes of judicial decisions, at least in
appellate courts.40 Some later scholars leverage this thesis to critique
justifications for judicial power resting on the claim that courts simply
apply the law.41 Some went further, arguing that the Realists' thesis
proved all law rationally indeterminate and therefore morally
illegitimate.4 2 By contrast, conventional institution-level claims in
normative constitutional theory tend to take the following form:
If courts apply legal rule X rather than legal rule Y, or
adjudicative approach P rather than adjudicative approach 0,
benefit 0 will be realized.43
39. See Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciaryis a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and
the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 555-64 (2004) [hereinafter
Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They] (asserting that most current interpretive theories
depend on intuition-backed assumptions about the feasibility of unitary judicial adoption
of one method or another).
40. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed,3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 398-401 (1950)
(arguing that, like case law precedent, canons of statutory interpretation are indeterminate
in actually litigated cases); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 75
(1928) (claiming that Anglo-American law has shifted away from stare decisis and moved
to following principles, rather than precedents). I am oversimplifying the Realists' views
here; although my formulation is accurate as to their core claim, it leaves out some nuance.
See generallyBrian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a NaturalizedJurisprudence,
in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15, 21-25 (2007) (synthesizing the core claim of
legal realism, which states that "judges respond primarily to the stimulus offacts ... rather
than on the basis of the applicable rules of law").
41. See Leiter, supra note 40, at 24-27 (discussing the Realists' influence).
42. See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151,
1152 (1985) (characterizing the realists as advancing the "corrosive notion that
purportedly apolitical legal reasoning actually masks political ideology (or oedipal
impulses)"); cf Leiter, supra note 40, at 18-20 (criticizing the characterizations of the
realists by writers in the "critical legal studies" style).
43. For some examples, which of course are significantly more nuanced than this
simple structural sketch might suggest, see generally Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under
the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 853 (2013) (arguing for throwing out the
"evolving standards of decency" test in favor of something closer to Equal Protection
Clause scrutiny to more fully and manageably implement the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment provision); Franita Tolson: Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a
Constrainton the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1195 (2012) (arguing that the Court
should abandon federalism-based constraints on the scope of the VRA to generate both
an interpretation of the statute more consistent with the intended allocation of
constitutional authority over elections and a generally more coherent body of federalism
doctrine); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional
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We can see a problem with attempting to blend the insights of
individual-level models with institution-level propositions clearly in a
modern debate about statutory interpretation. "New textualists""
argue that individual-level models of legislator behavior debunk the
notion of discernible aggregate congressional purpose and,
accordingly, that only the statutory text-which reflects the complex
amalgam of individual members' motivations and compromises in the
legislative process-should be given legal effect.45 If by congressional
"'purpose" we mean some institutional objective consistent with some
conception of the good, then textualists deny the very coherence of
attributing purposes to aggregate institutions like Congress.46 The
textualists' premise is a straightforward condemnation of
conventional, long dominant interpretive theories that rely on
congressional purpose; the related view that the proper role of courts
in the separation of powers is as "faithful agents" of Congress in
statutory interpretation cases; and-importantly-our long-held (if
intuitive) belief that Congress can and does act with collective
purpose.4 7
In deciding among competing theories, one important
desideratum is conservatism, or the extent to which the options leave
intact our other well-settled views about the world.48 The skeptical
premise does not comport with our long-held belief that Congress
frequently acts purposively; thus there remains reason to doubt
whether textualism accurately connects the individual and
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733 (2005)
(arguing for a "democracy and distrust" approach to federalism issues to optimize the
courts' capacity to police the federal-state balance).
44. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990)
(coining the term "new textualism" and generally critiquing the theory). For canonical
defenses of strict textualism, see, for example, ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutman ed., 1997); John F.
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001).
45. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 546-47
(1983); see also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287,
1293-98 (2010) (discussing theoretical predicates for textualism).
46. But cf Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)
(holding that the "letter" of a statute must yield to its "spirit" when the two conflict); John
F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 86-87
(2006) (noting that the method of statutory interpretation "now generally dominant" is a
Legal Process-based purposivism).
47. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the
"JudicialPower" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 10961105 (2001) (discussing how, historically, the use of the "plain meaning rule" has included
non-textual factors).
48. Leiter, supra note 34, at 1239 (considering conservatism in conjunction with two
other theoretical desiderata-simplicity and consilience).
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institutional levels of the system. As Professor Berman phrases the
point:
Of course the actions produced by multimember bodies
consisting of human agents can be produced for purposes. Each
of us has just too much experience imagining and describing the
purposes of such bodies-corporations, social organizations,
faculties, faculty committees, all in addition to legislatures-to
take seriously the skeptical claim... . [T]he concept of
multimember-body purposes is very likely ineliminable from
our conceptual terrain.49
If Congress does act with purpose and the other premises of the
faithful agent model are correct, then the Constitution obligates
courts to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with congressional
purpose. Constitutional theory presently lacks the analytic tools
needed to connect individual models of official behavior with our
institution- and system-level intuitions-and thus to perhaps resolve
the purposivism/textualism debate and others. Vermeule's account
promises to fill that void.
B. System Dynamics
The more nuanced "system of systems" view of the Constitution
suggests how we may analyze both individual and institutional actions
within a constitutional system and map out how the two relate to each
other and to the functioning of the system as a whole. Let us work
through some of Vermeule's claims with reference to the
textualism/purposivism debate. I will examine aggregation dynamics
and associated logical fallacies that plague conventional constitutional
theory; interdependence and feedback, dynamics that generate
system effects; system effects proper, focusing on their paradigm case,
invisible hand mechanics; and the theory of the second-best, which
derives directly from these system mechanics. Throughout, I will
return to the question of congressional purpose to tie these seemingly
disparate strands together.
1. Miracles of Aggregation; Fallacies of Composition and Division
Vermeule suggests that the skeptical textualist premise is at best
incomplete because it assumes a direct, linear relationship between
the properties (here beliefs and motivations) of the individual
members of an institution like Congress and the institution as a
49. Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce
Clause Doctrine,89 IOWA L. REV. 1487,1517 (2004).
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whole. This linear view suggests that if no member votes with a
purpose other than to increase their chances of re-election, then the
Congress can have no unified aggregate purpose because any such
purpose must be the sum of individual members' purposes, which are
too disparate to add up to anything coherent.s0
Vermeule asks us to consider the "miracle of aggregation," which
occurs where an electorate composed of individuals with belowaverage knowledge of relevant issues, upon aggregating all the votes,
reaches a result identical to the result that would have been reached if
each voter had above-average or perfect knowledge.5" If the
uninformed voters' errors are randomly distributed, they will tend to
cancel each other out-in a two-party race, each party will get about
forty-five percent of the vote in any case. If uninformed voters' errors
cancel each other out, then the candidate that wins at least half of the
remaining voters will win the election.52 A similar phenomenon is
highlighted by the familiar Condorcet Jury Theorem, according to
which, if members of a group who are only slightly more likely to be
right than wrong choose non-strategically between a correct and
incorrect alternative, then the likelihood that the majority will favor
the correct alternative increases toward certainty as the size of the
group increases.53
Vermeule draws from these observations a pair of analytical
cautions:
In the fallacy of composition, the mistake is to assume that if
the components of an aggregate or members of a group have a
certain property, the aggregate or group must also have that
property. In the fallacy of division, the converse mistake is to

50. But see VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 4-5.
51. See id. at 19-21.
52. But see BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY
DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 6-9, 21 (2007) (claiming that voter errors are

"systematic" and therefore undermine aggregation effects); Adrian Vermeule, ManyMinds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 2-4 (2009) (acknowledging
problems with reliance on aggregation dynamics).
53. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 15-16, 22-26; see MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, ESSAY
ON THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING,

reprinted in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33, 48-49 (Keith Michael Baker ed.,
1976). Vermeule explains that the Jury Theorem is based "in the law of large numbers"
and thus "is a mathematical relative" of the miracle of aggregation. VERMEULE supra
note 1, at 21. These system effects arise "not because there is a mysterious group-level
mind, but simply because the aggregation of individual judgments washes out random
error, and thus produces greater accuracy at the level of the group-an emergent
property." Id. at 15-16.
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assume that if the aggregate has a certain property, the
components or members must have the same property.5 4
These fallacies undermine both accounts of institutional or system
properties based solely on analysis of individual system agents and
arguments about properties that individual system agents must
possess in virtue of institutional or system-level properties. While
Vermeule's argument is simple, the implications are radical-it
undermines, for example, Wechsler's venerable political safeguards of
federalism argument, which attributes concern for continuing state
autonomy to federal institutions based on their members' dependence
on in-state constituencies;" the famous American Legal Realist
argument that the rational indeterminacy of some sets of legal
principles (like canons of statutory interpretation) shows that
individual judicial decisions must be based at least in large part on
non-legal factors;5 6 arguments that individual elected officials'
acceptance of significant campaign funds from corporations will
translate to a government dominated by the corporate agenda;" and
so forth. All such arguments, Vermeule maintains, overlook the
possibility that the interactions of many agents may produce novel
phenomena when aggregated."
Turning back to statutory interpretation, textualist skeptics
commit a fallacy of composition by denying the possibility of
aggregate legislative purpose based on the observation that individual
legislators have differing motivations for voting or otherwise making
decisions in their official capacities. The counter-proposition is a
version of the "doctrinal paradox"-individually incoherent decisions
of judges or members of Congress may in principle aggregate to form
a coherent jurisprudence or legislative program at the system level
54. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 9.
55. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954).
56. See Leiter, supra note 40, at 21-25 (reconstructing realism's "core" claims); supra
notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
57. See generally Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity:
Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 643, 657-62
(2011) (discussing corruption post-Citizens United); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political
Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118 (2010) (canvassing the forms of corruption that have
historically shaped campaign finance); Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign Finance
Safeguards of Federalism, 63 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 18-27),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2227115 (discussing the
role of corruption in the form of increased access for wealthy donors in campaign finance
reform debates).
58. see VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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even if the individual actors have no conscious intention to contribute
to such a system-level phenomenon. 9 There are numerous
implications, the most immediate of which is that these logical flaws
are sufficient in themselves to call into question the descriptive
premises of the skeptical case for textualism.
2. Interdependence and Feedback
Interdependence and feedback are characteristics of complex
systems that may explain the failure of compositional and divisional
claims.o Paradigmatic examples of interdependence are found in
ecosystems in which numerous species are interconnected in a
complex resource web, as well as in modern economies which have
interconnected participants, transactions, and financial institutions.61
Constitutional systems are similarly composed of interconnected
components: Individual legislators, judges, presidents, bureaucrats,
and so forth, are interdependent insofar as their actions shape and are
shaped by the actions of their colleagues; the institutions in which
they participate are interconnected in various ways (the courts
depend on Congress for jurisdiction, Congress depends on agencies
for implementation); and the individuals in one institution may be
affected by a different institution or its agents. Consider, for example,
that courts depend on Congress for jurisdiction; Congress depends on
agencies for implementation; legislators convinced that the Supreme
Court will strike down their statute if they choose wording X but that
it will survive with wording Y may choose a wording accordingly;
legislators who know a statute likely will be challenged before a strict
textualist judge may make drafting or voting decisions accordingly;
and so forth.
These interconnections generate non-linear causal sequences: A
component may be connected to many others in multiple ways, and
thus small changes to a single component's properties may have
disproportionately large effects on the other components across the
system and, thus, on system properties.6 2 For example, displacing any
59. See id. at 22-23.
60. See JOHN H. MILLER & SCoTr E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 27 (2007) (discussing
interdependence); Ruhl, supra note 12, at 893-94 (analyzing feedback).
61. See generally Simon A. Levin, Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex Adaptive
Systems, 1 ECOSYSTEMS 431 (1998) (discussing the interdependent nature of ecosystems);
BLYTH, supranote 13 (analyzing interdependent economies).
62. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 30; MILLER & PAGE, supra note 60, at 221;
Bednar, supra note 10, at 331-32 (noting that "aggregation effects can be nonlinear;
incremental improvements could make the whole [system] much better than the marginal
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one species may have disastrous cascading effects throughout an
ecosystem if it is central to a complex resource web (a "keystone
species").' Theorists working on climate change similarly face
difficulties in assessing policy prescriptions because the climate
system's dense web of interconnected elements can experience
substantial shocks from seemingly minor events." Interdependence of
agents and institutions "is perhaps especially an issue in political or
legal systems because of the non-independence of the institutions."6 5
In legal systems, "[i]nstitutional arrangements may be twitchy:
political and legal systems may be particularly prone to
discontinuities that would create large leaps in the institutional space
between first and second best institutional arrangements."'
Interdependence also may create redundancies that make for nonlinear effects in the opposite direction 6 -for example, removing one
of three species of plankton that are all plentiful and fungible to their
consumers may have a disproportionately small effect on an
ecosystem.
Feedback is information that system agents or components
receive about the effects of their interactions with other system
agents.68 Feedback loops are mechanisms by which feedback is
transmitted from one part of the system to another. 69 Feedback may
change to the component. But, it could also make it worse, perhaps much worse"); cf
EDWARD N. LORENZ, THE ESSENCE OF CHAOS 181-84 (1993) (explaining the "butterfly
effect" in chaos theory).
63. Levin, supra note 61, at 432-35. See Ruhl, supra note 12, at 892-95.
64. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 206, 264-69 (2012) (discussing the role of "nonlinearity," "tipping points," and
"fat-tailed risks" in climate policy analysis).
65. Bednar, supra note 10, at 331; see also id. at 328-29 (describing game theory work
that investigates the effects of interdependence by "varying one of the inputs" to see what
happens to the other system components).
66. Id. at 331.
67. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 7-8 (discussing how aggregation in a non-linear
system can drastically affect the entire complex system).
68. Cf Ruhl, supra note 12, at 893-94 (discussing forms of feedback in ecosystem
adaptation).
69. Cf Jianguo Liu et al., Complexity in Coupled Human and Natural Systems, 317
SCI. 1513, 1513-14 (2007) (citing numerous examples in which "people and nature interact
reciprocally and form complex feedback loops"). For discussion of feedback effects in law,
particularly the effects of peer networks on judges, see, for example, Daniel M. Katz &
Derek K. Stafford, Hustle & Flow: A Social Network Analysis of the American Federal
Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 506 (2010) ("[T]he existing social structure of the
hierarchical federal judiciary in part explains how an existing set of individual micromotives map to the aggregate macro-behavioral judicial outcomes."); Daniel M. Katz,
Derek K. Stafford & Eric Provins, Social Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the
"Evolution" of the Law: Toward a Positive Theory of JudicialSocial Structure, 24 GA. ST.
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cause an agent to alter its behavior in the future; this may change
system properties very little or, given non-linear causation, a great
deal.70 Interdependence and feedback reinforce the insight that
systemic dynamics cannot be exhaustively described by linear
reductive analysis.7 "Where social norms shape individual choices,
network externalities are strong, coordination is the operative goal, or
information is a substantial determinant of value, a methodology
strongly oriented to the analysis of individuals overlooks at least as
much as it reveals."72 Theorists will err if they ignore these and other
system properties.
These dynamics are present at both levels of organization in twolevel constitutional systems. Decisional constraints arise from the
official's relationships of interdependence with other officials and
groups both within and outside the institution.73 Local rules of
institutions-e.g., rules governing the introduction of bills and the
conduct of floor deliberations in Congress or the rules requiring
appellate judges to decide only the cases before them, on the issues
raised by the parties and on the basis of state legal reasoning-also
influence officials' decisions.7 4 Because of interdependence, action

U. L. REV. 977, 985-87 (2007) (discussing the effects of judges in peer networks whose
"interactions undoubtedly consequence aggregate outputs").
70. Some argue that dynamic responses to feedback help complex systems adapt.See,
e.g., Ruhl, supra note 12, at 893-94.
71. Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REV. 43,
44 (2011); see also VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 15 ("The failure to recognize system
effects leads to fallacies of division and composition"). See generally Kenneth J. Arrow,
Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1994)
(conducting a canonical exploration of these ideas in social choice theory).
72. Ahdieh, supra note 71, at 43; see Bednar, supra note 15, at 280 (discussing how
recent federalism research "explore[s] the boundaries of federalism . . . [as] a complex
adaptive system").
73. For classic treatments of the decisional constraints phenomena, see, for example,
Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2297, 2301 (1999) (raising questions regarding the current analytical foundations
upon which society bases its opinions and intuitions of decisional constraints at the
Supreme Court); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a
Strategic National Policy Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 584-85 (2001) (exploring
institutional constraints on Supreme Court justices); William H. Riker & Barry R.
Weingast, ConstitutionalRegulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of
JudicialDeference to Legislatures,74 VA. L. REV. 373, 394-95 (1988) (analyzing strategic
voting by legislators); see also Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond
Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1903,
1920 (2001) (exploring vote-trading rationales in the production of the various opinions).
74. See Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism:Circuit Court Discretion in
a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 504-05 (2012); see also Gregory Todd
Jones, Dynamical Jurisprudence:Law as a Complex System, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 873,
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according to local rules and the resulting feedback can give rise to
system effects seemingly unrelated to the local rules the agent
follows.75 Institutional or electoral constraints may neutralize agents'
biases; diverging biases may offset one another (as in the Jury
Theorem);7 6 and, on occasion, acting in accordance with a shared
purpose may also promote agents' individual interests."
At the second level of aggregation, institutional interdependence
introduces additional complexity. Legislators' awareness of 'judicial
methods of statutory interpretation may influence the legislative
processes upstream; some judicial approaches to statutory or
constitutional issues-clear statement rules, for example-may "cue"
Congress to take additional action;7 9 and Congress may respond to
judicial decisions by repealing or amending statutes, or in other ways,
after the fact.o Administrative agencies shape both congressional
action and, under deference doctrines, judicial statutory
interpretations." Federal courts may interpret statutes with an eye to
influencing future state court decisions on similar interpretive issues,
and state courts frequently consider federal precedents when faced
with federal statutory interpretation issues.82 Professor Friedman
873 (2000) (arguing that in animal groups "collective behavior results not from leadership,
but emerges from individuals following simple sets of local rules").
75. See Ruhl, supra note 12, at 894-97.
76. See supranote 53 and accompanying text.
77. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 58-63 (focusing on the question of judicial
"bias").
78. Cf Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation,
reprinted in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 269, 271-73 (Neal Devins & Keith E.
Whittington eds., 2005) (arguing that judicial constitutional methods influence Congress).
79. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservationof JudicialReview, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1596 (2000) (assessing interpretive
presumptions designed to force additional congressional deliberation about particular
issues).
80. Legislative action is costly, but Congress does override judicial interpretations of
statutes with some regularity. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 335-50 (1991) (documenting
congressional overrides for a 20-year period); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing
Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1328 (2012).
81. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (announcing a strong rule of judicial deference to agency interpretations).
Agency and presidential influence on statutory interpretation after enactment may create
incentives to shape legislation to compensate. Cf Rajiv Mohan, Chevron and the
President's Role in the Legislative Process, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 793, 817-27 (2012)
(discussing strategic agency interpretation and presidential influence in Congress).
82. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation:Methodology
as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) (examining statutory
interpretation approaches employed by federal courts interpreting state statutes and state
courts interpreting federal statutes).
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argues that interaction between the Supreme Court and Congress
improves the development of constitutional norms;83 Professor
Redish maintains that the interaction of federal and state courts
advances systemic values." Interdependence is not exceptional but
the norm throughout the system, and we should expect the actions of
courts or Congress to have surprising non-linear effects. Scholars
recognize instances of interdependences but tend to focus on single
linkages rather than system dynamics; this leads to linear analysis,
fallacies of composition and division, and other errors. A full
understanding of the system-level effects of this web of
interconnections requires empirical investigation, but such work can
only proceed if theorists keep the system-wide view in mind.
The possibility of non-linear causation further casts doubt on the
skeptical textualist critique of purposivism. Importantly, the fallacy of
composition runs both ways-legislators acting with shared purpose
may nevertheless fail to produce an aggregate congressional purpose
for a variety of reasons.8 6 For example, even if majorities in both
chambers of Congress hold a genuinely uniform purpose, procedural
requirements like overcoming a Senate filibuster, or the work of the
conference committee, could force compromises that result in an
enacted text that imperfectly communicates the purpose. Or, the
shared purpose may be but one among several goals each member
has for the legislation, and it may be deprioritized where
opportunities to advance other aims present themselves. More
generally, a purpose shared at a high level of abstraction might be
undermined by disagreements about more mundane implementation
issues, mistakes regarding the clarity with which the purpose is
communicated by legislative language, or differing views about how
much to compromise the purpose to secure enactment." That many
83. See generally Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court,
Congressand FederalJurisdiction,85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (suggesting that a dialogue
between Congress and the Supreme Court on federal jurisdiction is more normatively
persuasive than congressional control by itself).
84. See generally Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal"
Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861 (1985) (suggesting a
larger role for the Supreme Court in reviewing state court decisions dealing solely with
state law).
85. See VERMEULE, supranote 1, at 15.
86. This is a version of the "doctrinal paradox," or the idea that individually coherent
judicial decisions do not necessarily constitute a coherent jurisprudence in the aggregate;
however, individually incoherent judicial decisions might form a coherent jurisprudence in
the aggregate. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 22-23.
87. For a discussion of procedural obstacles in Congress and some implications for
statutory interpretation, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY &
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still believe Congress acts purposively suggests that linear individuallevel models do not reveal the whole picture. Further study that
accounts for intra- and inter-institutional aggregation dynamics is
required to know which side is correct. Vermeule's analytic
framework nevertheless can usefully advance the debate past logically
incomplete generalizations and inferences characteristic of the
conventional literature.
3. System Effects, Invisible Hands, and the Theory of the SecondBest
The next system dynamic to discuss is the one with which we
began-"system effects" and, directly related, invisible hand
mechanisms and second-best theory. Recall Searle's claim that
consciousness is an "emergent" property of brains, like liquidity for a
system of HO molecules in particular energy states." Vermeule
maintains that legal systems may have similar properties. Two related
theoretical moves-invisible hand arguments and the general theory
of the second-best-trade on an understanding of system effects, and
the system properties that give rise to them, in important ways. I
therefore examine them together here.
Vermeule defines "system effects" (called elsewhere "emergent"
or "irreducible" properties) 9 as system properties that "arise either
when what is true of the members of an aggregate is not true of the
aggregate, or when what is true of the aggregate is not true of the
members." 90 Condorcet's voting paradox shows that an aggregate of
voters with transitive preferences as among alternatives can,
depending on the voting procedure, display intransitive preferences
as a group." The intransitive preferences caused by vote cycling are
ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 69-99 (2d ed.
2006) (discussing the effects of proceduralist theories and interest group theories on the
legislative process); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7
Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528-37 (1992) (analyzing constitutional lawmaking under a game
theory model); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 716-33 (1992) (identifying desirable canons that make
statutory interpretation more efficient).
88. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
89. See Bednar, supra note 10, at 329-30 (referring to the irreducibility of systems
effects); Timothy O'Connor & Hong Yu Wong, Emergent Properties, STAN.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/propertiesPHIL.,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
emergent/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2013) (calling systems effects "emergent").
90. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 15.
91. See id. at 18-19 (discussing Condorcet's voting paradox); see also CONDORCET,
supra note 53, at 55-59 (exploring various different voting methods); MARQUIS DE
CONDORCET, AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF PROBABILITY THEORY TO
PLURALITY DECISION-MAKING (1785), reprinted in CONDORCET, FOUNDATIONS OF
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system effects-all of the individual voters' preferences are transitive;
they become intransitive only at the system level.' System effects
arise "not because the aggregate has some mysterious existence of its
own, over and above the individuals or institutions that comprise it."93
Instead, they arise "because the particular structure of interaction
among the members or components produces emergent properties at
the systemic level."94 The possibility of such irreducible system
properties-properties that cannot be explained by reference to
properties of the system's components alone-is the foundation for
the fallacies of composition and division. The simplicity and
familiarity of this idea-colloquially, that "the whole may be more
than the sum of its parts"-belies its power.
It seems clear that a constitutional system composed of
numerous institutions and their agents may, in principle, have
properties distinct from those of the agents, institutions, and subsystems that compose it." We saw above that avoiding the fallacy of
composition requires that we not draw inferences about system
properties solely from component properties.96 The corresponding
insight here is that we must acknowledge that a set of interdependent
but sub-optimally democratic institutions may under certain
conditions display robust democratic accountability as a system. This
seems to describe our system: We believe that we live in a democratic
state despite withering critiques commonly leveled at individual
branches-Congress is corrupt and gridlocked, the President only
responds to battleground state voters' preferences, federal courts are
countermajoritarian, and agencies are captives of interest groups.
Among other things, the biases of the institutions and their agents
may offset such that the system achieves near-optimal representation
of citizen preferences.' Thus, Vermeule contends, the extent to which
a system on the whole is democratic-or reflects democratic valuesmay be an emergent property, a system effect.98 Similarly, even if
SOCIAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL THEORY 131,132-35 (Iain McLean & Fiona Hewitt eds.,

1994) (demonstrating how the plurality voting method achieves intransitive preferences in
a group).
92. See generally NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 19-27 (1978) (discussing voting cycles in social choice theory).
93. VERMEULE, supranote 1, at 5.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 15.
96. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
97. Similar reasoning animates Vermeule's response to the countermajoritarian
difficulty. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 55-58.
98. See id. at 54-57 (arguing, also, that this "emergent democracy" idea solves the
countermajoritarian difficulty).
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individual judges always vote according to their political preferences,
avoiding the fallacy of composition requires acknowledging that a
multi-member court, the judiciary, or the system as a whole may not
behave in a manner explicable by reference to the sum of those
preferences.9 9 And, even if all members of Congress are corrupt, lazy,
or indifferent to constituent preferences, the Congress or the legal
system as a whole still may function in a manner consistent with
majority will or some other measure of public good.100 Members'
biases may offset one another; or "perhaps the graft causes
[legislators] to work harder or realigns [their] interests [with] others
beneficially; perhaps power[]grabbing improves the orientation of
authority; perhaps society is better off when a political agent is
[occasionally] inactive."' 0 '
Invisible Hands-The paradigmatic system effects are invisible
hand effects, including of course Smith's famous argument that
perfectly competitive markets produce allocative and distributive
efficiencies even if market participants have no conscious aim other
than advancing their individualized interests." Generalized, an
invisible hand dynamic is at work where an "overall system ...
produces a good that none of its components can individually
produce, and that none of its components may even intend to
produce."' 0 3 Other examples include Madison's argument that a
system of counterbalancing individual ambitions in government
promotes liberty at the system level;'" that political party competition
promotes public good and precludes majoritarian tyranny; that a
robust marketplace of ideas and an adversarial litigation system
produce true information; and that the common law "evolves toward
efficiency.""os Vermeule stresses that valid invisible hand arguments
require a mechanism to align individuals' actions giving rise to the
system effect with the systemic value to be promoted-efficiency,
truth, and the like.'06 In Smith's formulation, the price system is the
99. See id. at 58-60 (noting, in part, that "[i]f ... the political biases of individual
judges cut in different directions, the court as a whole can behave as though all judges are
principled law-followers"). On the attitudinal model, see supra note 37.
100. See Bednar, supra note 10, at 332-33.
101. Id. at 333.
102. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 67. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS: BOOKS IV-V 32 (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1999) (1776).
103. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 70.
104. See id. at 67; THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009).
105. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 67-70.
106. See id. at 70, 73-80.
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mechanism "that ensures that the behavior of actors under perfect
competition produces a system-level equilibrium ... that maximizes
social welfare."'" Vermeule notes that most of the other invisible
hand arguments that he discusses fail to specify this mechanism and
thus are incomplete-Madison's famous theory of checks and
balances, for example, "does not specify any mechanism that aligns
the 'private' costs and benefits to institutions with social costs and
benefits.""os But Vermeule's critique is not an impossibility proof;
better understandings of the causal interactions between the relevant
individual- and system-level properties may reveal the alignment
mechanism and thus, eventually, vindicate some of these
arguments.109
The Second-Best-The general theory of the second-best is
grounded in systems analysis and provides another path to similar
conclusions. It holds that if one or more condition(s) of optimal
system performance go unsatisfied, then the second-best state will not
necessarily come from maximizing the system's compliance with as
many of the other conditions as possible; instead, "multiple failures of
the ideal can offset one another, producing a closer approximation to
the ideal at the level of the overall system."110 Because system
components interact dynamically, compensating for deviations from
the optimum often requires a non-linear approach. For example, a
linear approach would suggest that, if the system is insufficiently
democratic, we should incrementally improve the democratic
responsiveness of each institution as far as possible."' This approach,
however, falls prey to a fallacy of division." 2 It ignores
interdependence and non-linear causation:

107. Id. at 73 (discussing Smith's invisible hand arguments).
108. Id. at 75; see also id. at 73-80 (critiquing other invisible hand arguments).
109. See Bednar, supra note 10, at 325 (offering suggestions for avenues through which
empirical verification of unexplained mechanisms is possible).
110. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 10; see also id. at 29-35 (discussing some second-best
dilemmas in law, politics, and American constitutional theory); Richard S. Markovits,
Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 3
(1998) (generalizing how the Second-Best Theory can have "startling legal implications for
law and economics analysis").
111. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 54-58 (discussing "emergent democracy" and the
countermajoritarian difficulty).
112. See id. at 30 ("It is tempting to think that if it would be best for all variables in an
institutional system to take on their optimal values, then it would be best for each variable
to take on its optimal value, considering the variables one by one. The general theory of
the second best, however, exposes this idea as a fallacy of division. Because the variables
interact, a failure to obtain the optimum in the case of one variable will necessarily affect
the optimal value of the other variables." (footnote omitted)); see also Bednar,supra note
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A departure from the democratic benchmark by one institution
might compensate for a departure ... by another institution, in

a different direction. What is important is that the failures of
democracy across the array of institutions should be
uncorrelated or negatively correlated, running in different and
perhaps even opposite directions. . . . The Senate favors small

states; the Electoral College favors groups with influence in
battleground states; ... the administrative state favors groups

who can organize to influence agencies and congressional
committees; the prestige and power of the Supreme Court
benefit the legal elites .... There is no one group that is
uniformly favored by each of these undemocratic institutions;
undemocratic power is, in a sense, democratically distributed.'
This line suggests, further, that the countermajoritarian difficulty
may be no difficulty at all, or may actually be made worse by
conventional "democracy-forcing" solutions like strict textualism.114
C.

Statutory Interpretationand Systems Analysis

Pause now to consider whether these system dynamics may help
explain how congressional purpose might emerge as a system effect.
The individual-level analyses that ground the skeptical textualist
critique of purposivism, if taken seriously, require that such an effect
must arise either at the institution-level in Congress or at the level of
the system as a whole through a combination of intra-congressional
dynamics and Congress's interactions with other institutions. First,
this is not logically implausible. Recall that reductionism like that of
the textualists reflects the view that a thing-here, a system-can be
exhaustively described as "nothing but certain other . . . things.""'

Thus, the textualist premise can be reformulated: Congressional
purpose is nothing but the compilation of the purposes of the
individual legislators." 6 But this is obviously not an exhaustive
description. To constitute official congressional action, bills need
more than individual members' votes-they must also run the
procedural gauntlet imposed by the Constitution," congressional
10, at 330 (characterizing the incremental democratization approach as committing "the
approximation fallacy").
113. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 51-52.
114. Id. at 54-58. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1st ed. 1962) (giving
canonical treatment to the countermajoritarian difficulty).
115. Searle, supranote 5, at 70.
116. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7.
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rules,"'s and legislative precedents.119 Individual legislators cannot
satisfy these; aggregates must take appropriate action-majorities or
super-majorities in the House or Senate, committee majorities, and so
forth. Reductionist accounts omit certain collective aspects of formal
legislative action and thus, there is room to amplify our picture of the
system.
Second, this idea is not wholly foreign to constitutional theory.
The literature on dialogic constitutional development suggests that
iterations of legislative action, judicial review, and congressional
reaction produce increasingly refined articulations of and compliance
with constitutional norms across the system. 12 0 A similar iterative,
interactive process (likely also including agency action) could
crystallize an initially unprincipled collection of legislator actions into
a body of statutes, regulatory and decisional law that, on the whole, is
consistent with majoritarian preferences or some other criterion of
public good.
Of course nothing entails that aggregate congressional purpose
must emerge as a system effect. Moreover, if it does so emerge, the
accompanying argument for officials' treating it as authoritative in
judicial, administrative, and other proceedings resembles an invisiblehand claim."' Vermeule's critique of invisible hand reasoning has bite
here-it is not immediately clear what mechanism would align the
components' interactions with the theory on which we value
discernible congressional purpose. 22 There are various possibilities:
Selection effects in Congress, the judiciary, and the administrative
state may cause vacancies to be filled primarily with moderates.123
Combined with reelection incentives regarding issues of high public
salience, this may align officials' actions in a manner that resembles
118. See, e.g., Comm. on Rules & Admin., Rules of the Senate, U.S. SENATE, http://
www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome
(last visited Aug. 16,
2013); CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 112-161 (2013).
119. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REv. 713,
719-36 (2008) (discussing congressional precedents).
120. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for
Incorporationof Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 249-51
(2001) (arguing that federal-state interaction produces better articulation and enforcement
of legal norms system-wide). See generally Barry Friedman, Dialogue and JudicialReview,
91 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1993) (challenging the countermajoritarian difficultly on the
premise that dialogic and internal system forces constrain the judiciary).
121. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 65-70 (giving examples of invisible-hand
arguments in law, economics, and American constitutional theory).
122. See id. at 73-74.
123. Cf id. at 111-17 (discussing three indirect selection effects and how they produce
systemic feedback).
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purposeful, aggregate pursuit of majoritarian preferences or the
public good.124 That we cannot specify a mechanism now does not rule
out discovering one eventually.125
Finally, second-best reasoning suggests that adopting
purposivism could in principle compensate better than textualism for
legislators' indifference to constituent preferences. If, for example,
the relevant deviation is the extent to which special interest groups
capture legislators, then strict textualist adherence to the letter of the
statutory text might under certain conditions magnify special interest
victories by entrenching them in judicial and administrative
precedent.126 Textualism might alter the incentives-interest groups
might more willingly incur capture costs than they would in a system
with a greater risk that courts will counter-balance interest group
influence by reading interest-group friendly provisions narrowly on
public interest grounds.127 Thus, while some textualists maintain that
their view solves or at least minimizes the countermajoritarian nature
of federal courts, a second-best analysis allows that under non-ideal
conditions, textualism could in principle make things worse while
purposivism, the more countermajoritarian interpretive approach,
may increase the system's overall democratic accountability. 1 28
Aggregate congressional purpose thus may exist in a causally
meaningful form, but a form meaningfully different from
conventional conceptions. It would not be the aggregate version of a
conscious intention that forms in an individual's mind when he or she
takes an action; instead, it likely would resemble a pattern that is
formed by the actions of Congress, the courts, and agencies as they
resolve disagreements about the scope and effect of legislation in a
dynamic, iterative process. It might be a tacit convention or common
understanding about how the statute should work, perhaps hard won
through conflict and debate, which gives agents a reason to do X
rather than Y in administering, enforcing, interpreting, or changing
124. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. For a seminal discussion of interest
convergence of this kind, see Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a
Regulatory Economist,REG., May-June 1983, at 12, 12-14.
125. See Bednar, supra note 10, at 330.
126. See generally OLSON, supra note 36 (linking special interest groups' accumulation
of political power to increasingly poor economic performance).
127. Cf VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 55-56 ("[I]t is a fallacy of composition to assume
that if the Supreme Court acts undemocratically, then the constitutional system will be
undemocratic overall. An undemocratic Court may be necessary to produce a
constitutional order that is democratic overall, perhaps because it is needed to offset
legislative failures....").
128. See id. at 55-58.

2014]

VERMEULE BOOK REVIEW

573

the statute. Courts actively working to identify congressional purpose
might contribute more to this dynamic than those practicing rigid
textualism; but this is not certain. Textualism might be more effective
than purposivism at triggering congressional re-engagement with
enacted statutes; and if Congress is better situated than courts to
contribute to articulating this convention, textualism might be
preferable.129 Our uncertainty on this score underlines the logical flaw
in pressing normative interpretive theories without attending to
systemic phenomena. If such an effect could be verified, then the
system perspective would reconcile skeptical observations about
individual legislator behavior with our intuition that Congress, or the
lawmaking process as a whole, is in some meaningful sense purposive.
Understanding the complex causal relationships between the
individual, institutional, and systemic levels of our constitutional
order will take time and effort. One of Vermeule's significant
contributions is to demonstrate analytic tools with which theorists
may finally bridge the gap between individual- and system-level
phenomena to construct a fuller, more capacious account of
constitutional practice. I examine some implications for normative
constitutional theory and general jurisprudence in the next Part.
II. SYSTEMS THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS

Most constitutional theory is normative, and every normative
claim depends on descriptive assumptions-for example, assumptions
about how legal institutions function or how existing legal norms
apply to certain cases. 30 Complex systems theory undermines most of
these assumptions. This does not mean that the prescriptive
conclusions are wrong, but if they are correct, they follow from more
sophisticated descriptive premises. Thus, Vermeule's second major
contribution is to give us a strong reason to move descriptive
efforts-particularly empirical research on system dynamics-to the
forefront of the research program. In this Part, I examine the
implications of Vermeule's view for several prominent strands of
129. See supra note 80 (qualitatively and quantitatively examining congressional
responses to judicial decisions); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Judging Congress,89 B.U. L.
REV. 525, 527 (2009) (focusing on Congress's engagement with constitutional
interpretation issues); Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511,
534-49 (2010) (canvassing comparative institutional competence literature).
130. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 8-9 (arguing that "a good deal of legal theory
falls flat because it overlooks" system effects); Andrew Coan, Toward A Reality-Based
Constitutional Theory, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 273, 274 (2011) (criticizing normative
constitutional theory for making, among other things, oversimplified assumptions about
actual constitutional practice).
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normative constitutional theory and argue that additional descriptive
work is needed to overcome these problems. Then, I turn to more
fundamental questions and consider how system dynamics might
inform our general account of law; that is, how it could helpfully
augment our standing answers to the deepest questions in legal
theory: What is law? How does constitutional law become
constitutional law? And, what criteria of legal validity establish norms
as legal norms as opposed to something else?
A.

Normative ConstitutionalTheory
We can divide normative constitutional theory into ideal theory,
which "asks the enduring questions of constitutional theory by
assuming that institutions and individuals will act as they should
act[,]" and non-ideal theory, which "relax[es] these idealized
assumptions and ask[s] contextualized questions such as . . . 'How
should the constitution be interpreted by the judges who actually
occupy the bench?' "131 Ideal theory has its place-some theses can
and indeed should be defended on conceptual grounds-for example,
claims regarding the legal, moral, political, or logical justifiability of a
practice. But it has limitations-especially as the approximation
fallacy cautions that results reached through ideal reasoning may
have less potent, opposite, or otherwise surprising results if
implemented in the real world.'32 Vermeule maintains that first-best
conditions are never perfectly satisfied; all normative proposals must
be implemented in a second-best world.' Systemic issues will always
bear on normative theory's claims.'" Non-ideal normative theses are
undermined if they ignore system effects because they perforce claim
descriptive accuracy. Vermeule argues that normative theorists' basic
descriptive assumptions are either without empirical basis or logically
flawed in the light of system dynamics.1'

131. Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L.

REV. 475, 476 (2004).
132. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
133. See generally Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, supra note 39 (arguing that
conditions are never ideal; thus, "ideal" constitutional theory has little purchase in reality).
134. Id. at 549-56. See generally Coan,supra note 130 (calling for greater recognition of
political realities in normative constitutional theory); Barry Friedman, The Importance of
Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257
(2004) (proposing a theory of judicial review based on system characteristics of the
judiciary); Richard Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998)
(criticizing normative constitutional theories lacking empirical bases).
135. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 6-7; see Ruhl, supra note 19, at 852-53 (arguing that
"the major schools of American legal theory have been so mired in reductionist thought
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The discussion of complex system characteristics in the previous
Part strongly suggests that this is correct, so here let us just briefly
consider a few examples: Some contend that the canonical written
Constitution is only part of the real Constitution, which also includes
extra-textual materials-"super statutes," "super precedents," and
others-that deserve constitutional status because they, too, structure
government institutions, establish rights, trump other laws, and are to
varying degrees entrenched against easy change.136 This view
acknowledges a more complex relationship between the Constitution
and the broader legal system than is conventionally assumed, but a
primary descriptive premise-that we can identify extra-canonical
norms as constitutional by their function-embodies a fallacy of
division. It assumes that the component norms of a system of
constitutional law must have the properties of that system. 13 7
But it is not obvious that all and only those legal norms with one
or more of these constitutional properties are properly part of the
expanded constitutional system. Properties like entrenchment might
obtain only as system effects and not properties of component norms;
some norms may be de facto entrenched for political reasons and not
because they are worthy of constitutional solicitude. So, too, the
contention that extracanonical norms, if treated as constitutional by
judges and other officials, will thereby gain beneficial constitutional
properties gives short shrift to the complex interdependencies of the
legal system. The result might be exactly the opposite: the norms'
capacity to discharge constitutional functions may exist only when
unacknowledged-publicly proclaiming the constitutional status of
extra-canonical laws could trigger calls for their repeal on the ground
that constitutional change must occur through the formal Article V
process."

The normative constitutional design literature now incorporates
insights from economics, political science, game theory, and other

that they have failed to see system behaviors that" frustrate attempts at a "predictive
model of law").
136. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE
L.J. 408, 415-28 (2007). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTION (2008) (arguing that an extra-textual, unseen constitution accompanies the
written document).
137. See generally VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 23-24 (discussing how the aggregation
of different individuals and institutions with different components creates an overall
constitutional order).
138. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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disciplines in mainstream works. 3 9 Vermeule, unsurprisingly, has
begun incorporating systems analysis into his work on constitutional
design,'14 0 but most design theorists still focus on modifying individual
system components-such as the amendment process or the Electoral
College. 14 1 The possibility, suggested by systems theory, that altering
components could have unforeseeable consequences across an
interconnected constitutional system means, at the least, that design
claims focusing on specific institutions, norms, or processes will be
difficult to assess-"constitutions," it turns out, "should not be
written by subcommittee," but instead with an eye to the system as a
whole.142 Moreover, as with other normative propositions, claims of
value from constitutional design advances may embody fallacies of
composition, division, or approximation.143
Recent empirical work suggests that the Supreme Court has long
decided cases in a manner consistent with public views such that the
Constitution is now a more democratically determined body of

139. See, e.g., JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN
(2009) (incorporating economic and political theory insights into analysis of optimal
design of federal systems); Adrian Vermeule, Precautionary Principles in Constitutional
Law, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 181, 181-83 (2012) [hereinafter Vermeule, Precautionary
Principles] (drawing on game theory, decision theory, and other disciplines to assess
competing versions of the precautionary principle as it relates to constitutional system
design).
140. See, e.g., Vermeule, PrecautionaryPrinciples,supra note 139, at 207-08 (discussing
selection effects in "precautionary constitutionalism"); Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible
Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 VA. L. REV. 1417, 1423-24 (2010) (discussing
invisible hand dynamics as legal and political design features).
141. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 8288, 159-80 (2006) (designing proposals to revamp senate and presidential elections and the
constitutional amendment processes); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional
Design of a Thayerian Congress,in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 242 (Neal Devins
& Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005) (limiting themselves to "incremental reforms" to
produce "the right quantity and quality of congressional deliberation" on constitutional
questions).
142. Bednar, supra note 10, at 331.
143. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 9-10, 87-89. Think, for example, of a claim that
judicial elections would make the system more democratic. See generally David E. Pozen,
Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2053 (2010)
(exploring the idea but not directly advocating judicial elections). This highlights the
fallacies of composition and approximation. Or consider that our stable federalism shows
that states' interests are well represented in Congress or, indeed, that states themselves
care much about federalism (showing the fallacy of division). See generally Wechsler,
supra note 55, at 546-47. Or that eliminating the Electoral College would improve
representation of majority preferences (exemplifying the fallacy of approximation). See
Sanford Levinson, So Much to Rewrite, So Little Time ..... 27 CONST. COMMENTARY
515, 519 (2011).
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norms. 1" The corresponding normative claim is typically that this
should be reinforced because it promotes democratic values, shores
up institutional legitimacy, or improves the substance of
constitutional law.14 5 These "popular constitutionalist" claims
implicitly recognize the significance of feedback between courts and
the public or more democratically representative institutions. But
they do not adequately account for the possibility of other complex
causal sequences; and this oversight undermines key premises.'" Few
theorists specify a mechanism to align judicial decision-making with
popular views. Selection effects, rather than direct reliance on public
opinion, may explain the results.'47 For example, interactions of
political and institutional dynamics in the presidential nomination and
senate confirmation processes may screen out all but ideologically
moderate nominees for the federal bench; and this might explain
decisions' correspondence with majority sentiment just as readily as
direct judicial enforcement of public views. Dynamics like these, if
proved to be the relevant mechanism, would cast doubt on
unsophisticated claims that the Court is or can easily be made into a
more majoritarian institution.'" Moreover, if some judges will
inevitably adopt different adjudicative approaches, it is a fallacy of
approximation to argue that we should have as many judges as
possible adopt the popular constitutionalist method.149 Second-best
reasoning suggests that this could in principle diminish the extent to
which the relevant benefits will be realized.
Intra-judiciary dynamics also call into question theses in the
debate among competing methods of constitutional interpretation144. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2009) (analyzing the influence of public opinion on the Supreme Court
since the drafting of the Constitution).
145. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (noting that the American people

have final interpretative authority over the Constitution); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (advocating a more populist brand of
constitutional law and interpretation).
146. Whether linear analysis leads to error in normative theory depends to some extent
on the theoretical maximand: If the goal is to alter the properties of the components
themselves-if, say, we want to improve public perception of the democratic
responsiveness of all government institutions, regardless of the actual democratic
benefits-then linear thinking may be sufficient.
147. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 102-07.
148. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing the countermajoritarian
difficulty).
149. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 137, 153-54, 172-73; Vermeule, The Judiciary is a
They, supra note 39, at 550-52.
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originalism, textualism, so-called "living constitutionalism," and other
theories.5 0 Vermeule devotes Chapter Five to the implications of
systems theory for this long-running interpretive debate.'"' In light of
the approximation problem mentioned above, Vermeule maintains, a
jurist sensitive to system effects should choose to act as an
interpretive "chameleon," adjusting her interpretive commitments
from case to case depending on her colleagues' positions in the
manner she thinks best to promote justice, fairness, judicial
constraint, democratic policymaking, or some other relevant
benefit."s2 The traditional goal of normative interpretive theoryproving one's theory superior to alternatives-thus seems
counterproductive. Since there always is (and likely always will be)
disagreement among judges, multiple plausible theories are needed to
make possible Vermeule's "strategic legalism," at least if the
objective is to promote some substantive goal."5
These examples suggest that we need to re-focus constitutional
theory on descriptive projects from the systemic perspective to better
assess normative value claims. Among other things, this change in
focus requires revisiting fundamental questions about the process by
which constitutional norms are validated.
B.

The Question of Norms

A fundamental question appears when we consider another
tension between individual-level analysis of legal actors and wellaccepted views about the system as whole. We believe that those in
positions of legal and political power are constrained by
constitutional norms. But individual-level accounts of officials'
behavior suggest that they act primarily on the basis of non-legal
reasons-political preferences, desire for financial gain or personal
power, and so forth.'5 4 How can we reconcile the macro-view with the
micro-view? This "problem of norms" has, in one formulation or
another, concerned legal theorists for decades and rightly so.' Just as
150. For a comprehensive overview of the interpretive debate, see generally Mitchell
N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that originalism is
based on faulty logic and erroneous premises and is implausible); Daniel A. Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989) (laying a
roadmap of the ongoing debate over original intent).
151. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 134.
152. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 153-54.
153. Id. at 153.
154. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
155. This fundamental question is at issue, in one sense or another, in diverse fields of
legal theory. See, e.g., HART, supra note 31, at 124-47 (examining rule-skepticism, or the
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debates in general jurisprudence about the nature of law have
theoretical implications for every aspect of legal theory and practice,
debates about legal norms' constraining power have implications for
our basic assumptions about the extent to which our system reflects
democratic values and the rule of law.
We might resolve the problem by simply concluding that our
system-level beliefs are mistaken in the light of public choice theory,
the attitudinal model; many have cast the idea of real normative
constraint away as a fiction on these grounds. 56 But that solution
leaves us with problems of political legitimacy and perhaps a national
identity crisis. Moreover, Vermeule's work suggests that it is a fallacy
of composition to conclude that individual officials' seemingly
unconstrained behavior aggregates to a system that is unconstrained
by constitutional norms."' In this Section, I suggest that systems
theory provides a new approach to the problem of norms. Like
consciousness, democratic accountability, or congressional purpose,
constraint by norms seems to disappear upon microanalysis of our
institutions and officials. Perhaps, then, it will reappear at the system
scale. If so, then systems theory once again will have provided a way
to reconcile our intuitive sense of the constitutional order with our
best theoretical and empirical evidence about the system's
components.
First, I will expand on the problem of norms and situate it in
debates in general jurisprudence, particularly the debate about the
meaning of theoretical disagreement. Then, I will suggest a systemstheory account that may answer the question of norms and resolve
the problem of theoretical disagreement as to at least some norms. It
view that norms do not constrain legal officials); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 37, at ch. 6
(attempting to determine empirically whether norms constrain judges); Mitchell N.
Berman, ConstitutionalDecision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3-18 (2004) (describing judicial
doctrine as in part shaped by non-normative considerations to account for the frequent
gaps between constitutional norms and implementing doctrines); Michael J. Gerhardt,
ConstitutionalConstruction and Departmentalism:A Case Study of the Demise of the Whig
Presidency, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 425, 431-57 (2010) (examining whether constitutional
norms are independently binding on non-judicial branches); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1213 (1978) (arguing that judicial doctrine underenforcing constitutional norms
nevertheless reflects constraint by norms); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (searching for explanations for judicial
decisions in terms of normative constraint).
156. See supra notes 37, 40-42 (discussing the attitudinal model and legal realism).
157. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 22-23 (noting the "doctrinal paradox," that it is
fallacious to infer something about a system of judicial decisions from the incoherence of
its member decisions and that it is fallacious to infer that coherent decisions will form a
coherent jurisprudence).

580

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

also potentially adds nuance to H.L.A. Hart's famous account of the
structure of law and legal systems by pinpointing a particular process
by which rules and norms can emerge that have not been previously
appreciated in the literature."' The argument is that either a rule of
recognition itself may be adopted through a system effect, or contains
criteria of legal validity that validate constitutional norms that arise as
system effects. The relevant system effects are patterns that form over
time in large bodies of official actions-like judicial opinions-and
that seem consistent with a normative proposition plausibly
characterized as a constitutional norm.159 I discuss here, as a prelude
to future work, whether such a "pattern proposition" can on some
account be considered normative.
1. Norm Systems and Theoretical Disagreement
We can think of constitutional law as a sub-system of the general
system of legal norms." Constitutional law's internal complexity
reinforces the problem of norms; attempting to trace norms' influence
through individual judicial decisions is difficult and may lead to normskepticism. For example, explaining what the law of the constitutional
structure is requires a great deal of qualification and reference to
adjudicative methods-formalism and functionalism, minimalism and
maximalism, originalism and non-originalism, textualism and
purposivism, and so forth. One might finally conclude that fixed
norms with ex ante determined content and constraining force do not
play any significant causal role in explanatory accounts of what legal
officials at the highest levels do in arguing about and resolving
disputes about the Constitution's structural requirements.
In federalism and separation of powers, for example, there are at
least three sources of confusion. First, these doctrinal categories are
made up of numerous lines of judicial decisions that are convoluted
and often inconsistent. In federalism cases, the core issue of federalstate relations subdivides into several distinct doctrinal fields; and
issues of "horizontal federalism," or state-on-state interaction,
generate yet another large cluster of only loosely connected

158. See John Gardner, Why Law Might Emerge: Hart's Problematic Fable 21-22
(May 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2269613
(noting that Hart left space for new theories to supplement his account).
159. See, e.g., Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 497, 538-61 (2012)
(highlighting such a pattern in dormant commerce clause, admiralty clause, and foreign
affairs powers jurisprudence).
160. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 23-24 (noting that systems whose components
are propositions can display system effects).
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doctrines. 61 Separation-of-powers doctrine involves questions of the
legislative process, authority over executive officials, the scope of
Article III jurisdiction, horizontal relations between kinds of federal
tribunals, and many others.162 Second, the complex relationships
between strands of structural doctrine are such that even seemingly
minor modifications in one area can, over time, have dramatic effects
on others. Take a federalism example: the Supreme Court's
abandonment of active judicial enforcement of general federalismbased limitations on federal power, exemplified by its rejection of the
National League of Cities doctrine in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro
Transportation Authority, 163 arguably led to a retooling of much

federalism doctrine to emphasize judicial intervention to reinforce
political safeguards rather than categorical prohibitions." Another
aspect of this complexity is the interdependence of federalism and
separation-of-powers doctrines-for example, rigorous judicial
enforcement of a Congress-centric separation-of-powers doctrine
indirectly preserves state authority in light of states' influence in the
national legislative process; 6 5 and federalism doctrine solicitous of
intergovernmental cooperation indirectly reinforces a Congresscentric separation of powers by subjecting Executive agencies to selfinterested state government "pushback."1 66
161. In the vertical category, consider the differences between enumerated powers
doctrines, federal preemption doctrine, the anticommandeering rule, state sovereign
immunity doctrine, spending doctrine, choice of law, and the numerous other judicial
federalism doctrines. For a definitive substantive overview of vertical federalism doctrine,
see, for example, Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (2004). In the horizontal federalism context, the strands of doctrine are even more
numerous and varied-including everything from federal constitutional limitations on
state-court personal jurisdiction, rules of comity, the dormant commerce clause doctrine,
doctrines governing state election law, and so forth. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Horizontal
Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008).
162. See John F. Manning, Separationof Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,124 HARV.
L. REV. 1939, 1942 (2011) (noting that this category of structural doctrine involves
"countless... issues relating to the operation of the modern federal government").
163. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
164. See generally Young, supra note 161, at 18-33 (discussing the impact National
League of Cities had on federalism); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism,
46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1367-80 (2001) (canvassing the process the Court undertook to
retool federalism doctrine).
165. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism,79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1342-46 (2001).
166. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguardfor Separation of
Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2011) (discussing how states' resistance to the executive
furthers the separation of powers doctrine); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (depicting and analyzing state
resistance as "uncooperative federalism").
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A third source of complexity in structural doctrine-and
persistent
methodological
generally-is
law
constitutional
disagreement among judges and other legal officials.167 While the
legal system as a whole is characterized by "massive and pervasive
agreement about the law throughout the system[,]"' 68 the "history of
interpretive theory in American courts is, above all, a history of
persistent and deep disagreement among judges and courts about the
proper methods and sources of legal interpretation."169 Disputes over
the proper interpretation of constitutional provisions or the content
or application of constitutional norms may result in changed
constitutional doctrine;n 0 there also may be disputes about the
normative grounding of existing doctrine even if the doctrine itself is
supported by consensus.'
Aside from their tendency to make the task of determining
"what the law is" quite difficult, these disagreements have significant
conceptual consequences for legal positivists' general theory of law.
Some theorists maintain that disagreements about the proper
methods for identifying the content of valid legal norms-or about
the proper way to interpret concededly valid sources of law such as
statutes or constitutions-are, in fact, disagreements about the legal
system's criteria of legal validity.172 Recall that, in Hart's view, the
rule of recognition embodying those criteria is a social rule by which
all legal rules are validated and, thus, is the lynchpin of a legal
system."' A social rule of recognition exists if and only if there is
widespread consensus among the system's legal officials about the
criteria of legal validity and those officials accept those criteria as

167. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES,
15-21 (4th ed. 2011). Supreme Court Justices famously disagree about interpretive
methods and have written scholarly books defending their own interpretive views. See,
e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005); SCALIA, supra note 44.
168. Leiter, supra note 34, at 1227.
169. Vermeule, The Judiciaryis a They, supra note 39, at 556.
170. And there are, of course, a variety of internecine battles within the larger war of
interpretive disagreement-as Vermeule puts it, "judges who emphasize the ordinary
meaning of constitutional and statutory text criticize those who emphasize the purposes of
framers or legislators, who in turn criticize devotees of specific legislative intentions; each
of these groups itself fractures into competing variants." Id.
171. Cf Ellen E. Sward, Justification and DoctrinalEvolution, 37 CONN. L. REv. 389,
414-16 (2004) (discussing the Court's rejection of Swift v. Tyson in favor of the Erie
doctrine as, in part, about changing justifications for federal court choice of law rules).
172. See supra note 30.
173. HART, supra note 31, at 94-95, 100-10.
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obligatory.174 Theoretical disagreements among officials arguably
reflect the absence of the consensus or internal acceptance required
for the emergence of a social rule."' One conclusion, on Hart's view,
would be that theoretical disagreement means we do not, in fact, have
a rule of recognition and, thus, a legal system. Since that cannot be
credited, we might instead conclude that the persistence of theoretical
disagreement reveals a flaw in either Hart's account of the conditions
under which social rules are formed or his claim that the rule of
recognition is a social rule. Either conclusion suggests that Hart's
account fails to capture something important about the phenomena in
our legal system. 176
Nobody seriously claims that constitutional norms do not exist,
of course; but many do claim-on what Leiter calls the "skeptical
doctrine"-that they play little or no causal role in official decisionmaking.177 Doctrinal complexity and theoretical disagreement
reinforce norm-skepticism predicated on individual-level accounts.
But it is a fallacy of composition to assume, based on norms'
seemingly minimal causal power, that constitutional norms must lack
causal power with respect to the system-wide dynamics of the
constitutional order. Considering system effects may provide a
solution the problem of norms and a new refutation of the theoretical
disagreement critique of positivism.
2. Patterns and Norms
I have argued elsewhere that, when considered in the aggregate,
patterns emerge from the chaos of structural doctrine at retail.
174. See id. at 32, at 106-110; Leiter, supra note 34, at 1220-24 (summarizing Hart's
view and pinpointing Dworkin's theoretical disagreement-based objection to it).
175. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text; see also DWORKIN, supra note 29,
at 4-6 (defining "theoretical disagreement" as "disagreement about what the law really
is"); Leiter, supra note 34 (critiquing Dworkin's "refutation" of positivism); Shapiro, supra
note 30, at 50 (arguing that the Hart-Dworkin debate has not been settled as some
scholars assert).
176. While theoretical disagreements are viewed as central and of enduring fascination
in constitutional theory, Professor Leiter rightly points out that it is not obviously a central
phenomenon in the legal system. See Leiter, supra note 34, at 1220.
177. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realisms, Old and New, 2013 VAL. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract-id=2079819 (categorizing as adherents of the "skeptical doctrine" both the
Scandinavian and American Legal Realists, and other theorists who "are ... skeptical that
the legal doctrine the courts articulate explains their decisions").
178. See Pursley, supra note 159, at 514-19; see also Garrick B. Pursley, Defeasible
Federalism, 63 ALA. L. REV. 801 (2012) [hereinafter Pursley, Defeasible Federalism]
(arguing that federalism doctrine may be organized around a basic norm and a pattern of
variable normative force in different applications).

584

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

Lines of structural decisions, developed over time, appear to be
organized around broad normative propositions that, while rarely
articulated by courts as the controlling constitutional norms,
nevertheless may explain and justify the outcomes in most of the
cases if the propositions are viewed as constitutional norms. For
example, the constitutional grounds of dormancy doctrines-the
dormant commerce clause,"' dormant foreign affairs powers, 1s0 and
dormant admiralty doctrines' 8 -are subjects of intense debate, but
their application across contexts and over time forms a pattern.18 2
Dormancy decisions may all be explained as implementing the "state
preclusion thesis"-a simple proposition that state governments may
not take action that undermines the constitutional structure of which
they are a part.183 Call this a "pattern proposition." Other pattern
propositions may be adduced in other contexts that are rife with
complexity and theoretical disagreement, all of them abstract and
conducive to a variety of pragmatically formulated implementing
rules suited to different circumstances.'8 Courts may not explicitly
reference these pattern propositions as grounds for decision in
individual cases; yet they repeatedly render decisions consistent with
them. This observation raises significant conceptual questions.
Assuming arguendo that certain pattern propositions are fairly
derived from large clusters of constitutional decisions that seem
otherwise to have at best contestable constitutional predicates, the
question arises: What are these pattern propositions? Systems theory
suggests a possible justification for characterizing them as
constitutional norms of some kind-a novel idea worth exploring. 8
179. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330 (2007); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994)
(discussing the dormant foreign Commerce Clause doctrine).
180. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
181. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), superseded by statute,
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 901, 902 (1940)), as recognized in Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v.
Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
182. I have explored these controversies at length elsewhere. See generally Pursley,
supra note 159, at 528-29 & n.165 (canvassing dormant Commerce Clause debates); id. at
550-51 (similar for dormant Admiralty Clause doctrine); id. at 559-60 (similar for dormant
foreign affairs powers doctrines).
183. Id. at 520-22.
184. Id. at 506-12 (exploring the implementation space between norms and doctrine);
see also Berman, supra note 49, at 1521-23 (discussing instrumental issues bearing on
doctrinal formulation).
185. Professor Bednar says that Vermeule's invocation of the relationship between
norms and conventions shows sympathy for the idea that some constitutional norms may

2014]

VERMEULE BOOK REVIEW

585

The fact that courts do not explicitly cite them as norms in opinions
creates a problem, of course, but there are at least three possible
explanations: First, pattern propositions might not be norms. That
returns us to the perhaps equally vexing question of why the patterns
exist at all. Second, they might be norms that courts intentionally and
systematically refuse, for whatever reason, to reference or rely on in
written opinions. That would require a degree of coordination and
long-term planning that, given what we know of judges and the
judicial system, would make this answer deeply surprising if true.' 6
The third and more exotic possibility is that pattern propositions
are constitutional norms of a kind that courts somehow enforce
without explicitly or perhaps even consciously recognizing that they
are taking actions or making decisions consistent with them. If
pattern propositions represent emergent ordering properties of the
constitutional system, then in principle it seems that we might find
individual system agents acting without full or direct awareness that
they are creating the pattern of decisions even as they are creating
it.187
This theory raises interesting questions and opens new avenues
for research. To defend the proposition that some constitutional
norms emerge as system effects, we would need to explain the nature
of the relevant system effects, the mechanism(s) that produce them,
and the sense in which they matter for constitutional theory and
practice. And supposing that legal officials sometimes act in a manner
that contributes to the establishment of, or is otherwise consistent
with, norms that can only be identified by considering the

emerge from component interactions as system effects. See, e.g., Bednar, supra note 10.
But Vermeule's discussion of the difficulty of accounting for norms in invisible hand
arguments seems to characterize non-legal norms as side-constraintson system agents that
might affect production of the relevant invisible hand mechanism. See VERMEULE, supra
note 1, at 80-87 (concluding that "the sheer lumpiness of norms [resulting from the
inability to sufficiently fine tune them] is ... a kind of imperfection in the available
technology for coping with market imperfections"); cf id. at 86 (acknowledging the
familiar view that social and moral norms are developed by decentralized interactions of
agents and institutions). In any case, any nascent theory of emergent norms is
undeveloped in the book.
186. The Realists maintained that legal reasons are not primary causes of judicial
decisions. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. Here, however, the question is
not about the real causes of decisions, but the reasons recited in judicial opinions even if
they are mere camouflage for non-legal motives. It would be odd for courts engaged in
consistent subterfuge like this to disregard entire categories of potentially useful legal
grounds for case outcomes.
187. Cf VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 22-23, 67 (noting that actions can contribute to
system effects unconsciously).
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constitutional system as a whole is problematic for a variety of
reasons.
First, legal officials frequently appear to exercise conscious,
direct, and intentional power to create, articulate, and enforce legal
norms. It requires some additional analytic work to flesh out the idea
of systemic norm articulation and enforcement, then, to believe that a
process other than the familiar one produces some of the causally
significant norms of our legal system. Second, even if we can explain
how they arise, for these system effects to matter for constitutional
practice, we must also explain how they might figure in the best
causal account of some individual, institutional, or systemic outcomes.
Law imposes obligations, communicates information about those
obligations and how to comply, and when violated, triggers sanctions.
It is not obvious how these "pattern" norms are capable of
discharging those functions-especially since the lack of explicit
official references to them suggests that officials do not perceive them
as primary causes of legal outcomes.
More generally, we would need to know what kind of thing law
must be to satisfy our concept of law and whether norms generated as
system effects can possess the properties law must have or their
functional equivalents. Can a system effect have all the properties
that legal norms must have to be counted as legal norms? Can there
be, for example, causal relationships between system effects and the
actions of agents of the constitutional system-might some system
effect figure in the best causal account of an agent's decision to take
actions that amount to "following" or "enforcing" the law?
For propositions to qualify as legal norms on the positivist
account of the nature of law, those propositions must be validated
according to the criteria of legal validity accepted by large
proportions of the system's legal officials from what Hart called "the
internal point of view."' Adopting and complying with social rules is
distinct from "general habit[s] of obedience," as to a monarch.189
Social rules, including rules of recognition, are formed through a
process of long-term and widespread repetition of practices consistent
with the rule, whether individuals view their actions as mandated by
rule or not.19 Over time, social conventions may come to be seen as
mandatory rules. On Hart's account, part of this process requires that
188. HART, supra note 31, at 86-91.
189. Id. at 53. See also Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundationsof
Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1171, 1177-78 (2006)
(discussing Hart's analysis of this point).
190. See Perry,supra note 189, at 1178-79.
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a system's legal officials accept the social rule's requirements from
"the internal point of view"-rather than simply repeating past
actions out of a sense of tradition or fear of sanction, one believes
oneself legitimately bound, justified in criticizing others for deviating,
and legitimately subjected to criticism for deviating.19 1
Systems theory might augment Hart's account in at least the
following ways: Rules of recognition and other social rules-which
Hart already describes as creations of widespread patterns of
convergent practice formed over time-might be characterized as
system effects. This would suggest, of course, that at least some of the
system's legal officials may "accept" aspects of the rule only
unconsciously, tacitly, since system effects need not be intentionally
created by system components. Perhaps the rule of recognition is
more consciously observed, but at least some of its criteria validate, as
legal norms, conventions arrived at by durable acquiescence, even if
most following those conventions are not conscious of their role in
creating them. There is no barrier in principle to legal officials
accepting such criteria, and such criteria do not necessarily involve
any evaluative judgment of the norms that they validate."' Hart's
view requires nothing more for the contents of a rule of recognition.
This might explain the appearance-in light of both theoretical
disagreement and the existence of pattern propositions-that some
constitutional norms may best be explained as system effects.
Another possibility is that our system's secondary rules of change
allow some first-order norms to be validated by repeated
acquiescence, like rules of precedent that validate judicial
development of common law norms. All of these conjectures require
adding nuance to Hart's account of acceptance from the "internal
point of view."193 As John Gardner explains, "Hart did not get very
far in his attempts to understand what makes norms into norms, or

191. HART, supra note 31, at 57.
192. In our system, we would be talking about patterns of convergent practice that
come to be embodied in official statements of decision (judicial opinions, executive policy
directives, and so forth) that we generally accept as authoritative sources of law without
any evaluation of their merits. Of course, Hart's view allows that in any particular system,
the rule of recognition might include evaluative criteria-his claim is only that there is no
necessary connection between, for example, moral validity and legal validity.
193. Cf Adam Perry, The Internal Aspect of Social Rules (July 25, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2298513
(canvassing recent work in philosophy of action to give a deeper account of Hart's
"internal point of view").
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rules into rules."194 This leaves it to us to fill in the missing picture of
how social rules and legal norms emerge.
How can officials view as obligatory and comply with content
they dispute or do not fully understand? System effects are those
properties of a system that individual components lack-norms on
this view are produced by agents' interactions even if they do not
consciously seek to contribute to such a process. Unconscious
acquiescence is consistent with Hart's claim that conventions become
rules in part from sheer repetition of adherent conduct. However,
even if pattern propositions provide an ordered description of official
behavior to an outside observer, it remains to be established whether
the internal cognitive processes generating behavior consistent with
pattern propositions are a form of internal acceptance sufficient to
confer legal validity on Hart's account. It may involve a process
similar to Hart's account of the process by which customs,
conventions, and usages of trade, for example, become rules of
common law. If legal officials as agents of the system durably conform
their conduct to pattern propositions, then there may be a sense in
which officials can be said to "accept" those propositions as binding
norms. Perhaps they consciously sense being broadly bound by
obligations of law that are worked out by official practice over timea sense of constraint by precedent, institutional limitations, abstract
notions of fairness, and so forth. It seems unrealistic to believe that
every legal official has a complete internal picture of the rule of
recognition. This form of acceptance might not be straightforwardly
cognitive, but it would nevertheless establish the propositions'
organizing function in the constitutional system. If we can say that
complex forms of acceptance are permissible instances of something
similar for some validity criteria or constitutional norms-acceptance
"from the internal point of view"-then we might usefully extend
Hart's theory of law and formulate a new refutation of the problem of
theoretical disagreement. 9 s Conscious disagreement seems to matter
less if legal officials unconsciously or tacitly act to contribute to
system effects.
Legal status-legal validity, legitimacy, and so forth-might not
be something that is conferred ex ante but instead accretes over time
through system effects. If that is the case, then even poorly motivated
judges may participate in a system that gives rise to norms because
their motivations could, in principle, be irrelevant to the causal
194. Gardner, supra note 158, at 22.
195. See supra notes 30-32, 174-75 and accompanying text.
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connection between the decision and the larger pattern that becomes
the norm; it is a fallacy of composition to assume that poorly
motivated decisions-or decisions rendered under conditions of
theoretical disagreement-must necessarily result in invalid norms.'96
Hart was engaged in descriptive sociology;'" thus, presumably, he
would be interested in a thorough account of the ways in which
people, and legal officials, actually behave. And as Hart pioneered
the "practice theory" of rules,9 he might accept the idea that the
norms officials appear to accept, based on their conduct, are thereby
validated in some instances. A more sophisticated understanding of
the processes by which societies organize themselves should lead us to
add nuance to Hart's picture of the adoption of social rules. On the
systems view, norm-constrained behavior would not be solely an
effect of norms; it would be in part a system effect produced by
complex dynamics. Thus, claims that any particular norm "caused" a
judicial decision are as inapt as causal claims about mental states on
Searle's view.'99 The causal relationships between individual agent
actions, which often seem unconstrained by norms, and the normconstrained system as a whole, are complex. We would still have
grounds for critiquing these emergent norms-to say these patterns
are norms is not to say they are justified or desirable. But as to the
existence conditions for a rule of recognition, and thus a legal system,
recall that Hart's view was designed to make it possible to call the
Nazi legal system a legal system.200 It therefore seems permissible for a
Hartian positivist to maintain that "the constitutional norms that we
have include those that are consistent with the durable patterns of
official behavior that we can observe with regard to questions of
constitutional compliance."
196. Hart's description of the process of social rule formation, as with other descriptive
claims we have examined, may need updating in the light of system effects. But again, the
conclusions may be correct-indeed, it would be quite something if they were not given
the influence and intuitive appeal of Hart's account. The premises of the argument simply
need some additional nuance. Nor is this as extraordinary a claim as it might seem
(claiming to have found incompleteness in Hart and remedied it); "[tioday ... most legal
philosophers think that Hart's account of the attitude that underlies a social rule is too
general, and that his theory is overinclusive as a result." Perry, supranote 193, at 1.
197. HART, supra note 31, at vi.
198. This is the label commonly given to Hart's account of social rule formation. See,
e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality: Hart's Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1168 (2008).
199. See Searle, supra note 5, at 69-70 (stating that consciousness occurs from the
"causal interactions between elements of the brain at the micro level").
200. See Phillip Soper, Some NaturalConfusions About Natural Law, 90 MICH. L. REV.
2393, 2401-02 (1992).
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CONCLUSION

The systems-theory view, though still embryonic, augers a radical
break from previous systems of normative thought in constitutional
theory-from asking about pre-existing abstract criteria of legal
validity (as though they are floating in the ether somewhere to be
discovered and understood through transcendental analysis), to
asking about the criteria of legal validity and the resulting norms that
are apparent from observing patterns of official and public practice.
Vermeule's path-breaking systems-theory perspective may, if
developed carefully and thoroughly, illuminate complex legal
practices and help us better understand the interdependencies of legal
agents' complicated patterns of practice. It might, in other words, be a
fine-tuned enough tool to finally give us a "bottom up" descriptive
account of our constitutional norms. Such an account might finally
move us past long-standing disputes in constitutional theory,
including the debate about constitutional interpretation. Vermeule
suggests a new descriptive and institutional turn in legal scholarship, a
turn towards engaging system dynamics rather than relying on
oversimplified assumptions that result in error. In making the case to
move the literature, Vermeule has succeeded admirably.

